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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO

CHARLES MURRAY, ADMNSTR,
Plaintiff

CASE NO. 312322

v

JUDGE SUSTER

STATE OF OHIO,

STATE'S
MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF ADMISSION OF
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD'S
\>VRITINGS IN MORETTI BOOK

Defendant

The State of Ohio, by and through counsel, William D. Mason, Prosecuting Attorney for
Cuyahoga County, and A. Steven Dever, Assistant Prosecutor, submits herewith its
Memorandum in Support of admission into evidence of the written statement of Samuel H.
Sheppard , inscribed in Phyllis Moretti 's copy of the book authored by Sheppard, Endure and

Conquer. The state submits that the statement is an admission against interest and admissible
pursuant to Evid. R. 804 (B)(3), and as evidence attacking the credibility of a hearsay declarant
pursuant to Evid. R. 806, all as set forth in the memorandum attached hereto and incorporated
herein by reference.
Respectfully Submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, CUYAHOGA
COUNTY PROSECUTOR

.Ste en Dever
Marilyn Cassidy (00146 7)
Assistant Prosecutors
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-7785

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SHEPPARD'S WRITTEN ADMISSION
AS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE

STATEMENT AGAINST PECUNIARY/ PENAL INTEREST

Pecuniary Interest
In creating the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule, Evid.R. 804(B)(3)
provides:
Statement against interest. A statement that was at the time of its making
contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by
the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would not have made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true. A
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability, whether offered to
exculpate or inculpate the accused, is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
In Trimble v. Stewart (1988), WL 14074 (11th Dist), unreported,

(attached) the reviewing court upheld the admission into evidence, pursuant to
Evid. R. 804(B)( 3), of two letters from the deceased to her father. Father had
forwarded twenty three thousand dollars for the decedent to deposit in her account
and to make certain investments on his behalf. Two letters from the decedent
acknowledged his ownership of the funds and her intention to do with them as he
wished. In affirming the letters' admissibility, the court found the letters to be, at
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the time of their making, so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or
proprietary interest

* * * that a reasonable man in his position would not have

made the statement unless he believed it to be true.
The statement at issue satisfies criteria set forth by Ohio courts for admission
into evidence as an 804 (B)(3) statement against interest. First, Sheppard's statement is

'
clearly against his pecuniary interest.
Phyllis Moretti will testify that Sheppard signed
the book in April of 1969. At that time, Sheppard had a lawsuit pending against Louis
Seltzer, the Cleveland Press and Dr. Samuel Gerber. The complaint, filed in November of
1967, sought damages for alleged injury to his character and for alleged wrongful
conviction and ten year imprisonment. The complaint was dismissed from the district
court and Sheppard took an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. That
court did not render its opinion until January 21, 1970. (See Exhibits A & B, attached).
His written admission that he perpetrated the homicide of Mrs. Sheppard would without
question invalidate any claim of wrongful conviction or defamation.

Penal Interest
Evid. R. 804 (B) (3) also provides that statements against one's own penal interest
may be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rnle . It is significant that despite his
ultimate acquittal on the murder charge, and his insulation from further jeopardy
resulting from her death, Samuel H. Sheppard's admission to the murder of his wife
could subject him to a charge of perjury. Dr. Sheppard testified under oath in his first
trial that he did not commit the homicide. Perjury is a felony of the third degree and
carries with it the possibility of incarceration and fines.
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Dr. Sheppard is indisputably unavailable. Finally, as for indicia ofreliability, the State of
Ohio will present expert testimony identifying the handwriting as that of Samuel
Sheppard. In addition the State will present Susan Fortunato, a forensic chemist for the
Secret Service who will identify the ink as ink that was commercially available as of
May of 1961.

THE STATEMENT IS ADMISSIBLE PURSUANT TO EVID. R. 806,
IMPEACHMENT OF A HEARSAY DECLARANT

Through various witnesses, including the former testimony of Sam Sheppard, and the
examination of Fred Drenkhan, F. Lee Bailey, Sam Reese Sheppard, and others, the
hearsay testimony of Samuel H. Sheppard has already been admitted into evidence. As
such, the State of Ohio is now permitted to attack the credibility of Samuel H. Sheppard
the same as if he had been a testifying witness. Evid R. 806 provides in pertinent part:
(A) When a hearsay statement ... has been admitted in evidence, the
creditability of the declarant may be attacked ... by any evidence that would
be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.
The credibility of Samuel H. Sheppard is now subject to attack by the State of Ohio by all
permissible means, including the presentation of inconsistent statements, bias interest,
etc ..
When hearsay testimony is admitted in a trial, particularly, when the declarant of
hearsay is not presented at trial, Evid. R. 806 operates to alleviate in some degree the
disadvantage which arises when the jury is not given an opportunity to view the
declarant's demanor or "to see his credibility and veracity tested under cross
examination." State v. Klein (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 208, 212. Indeed, the refusal to
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permit an attack on the credibility of a hearsay declarant is highly prejudicial and has
resulted in the reversal of criminal convictions. State v. Klein, supra at 212. (Inasmuch
as the trial court received in evidence [declarant] Emmons' hearsay statement through
[witness] Taylor's testimony, it committed error prejudicial to [criminal defendant]
appellant by excluding Emmons' inconsistent written statements offered to impeach him.

,
Reversal [of the conviction] is therefore required.") (State v. Crossen October 18 1988),
4th

Dist. Case No. 902 unreported, (attached) (reversing a conviction and holding that

non-testifying "declarant's inconsistent prior or subsequent statements, whether oral or
written, may be admitted for purposes of impeaching him.")
The right to impeach a non-testifying declarant pursuant to Evid. R. 806 exists
irrespective of whether the party against whom the hearsay was admitted objected and
even if the proponent of the hearsay later argues that the statements were not offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. State v. Watson (1991), 61 Ohio St. 3d 1, 6-7.
In the instant case, numerous statements of Samuel H. Sheppard have
already been admitted into evidence. Accordingly, the State of Ohio is entitled to
impeach the credibility of Samuel H. Sheppard as a declarant by use of his writings in the
Moreti book.

5

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, defendant respectfully submits that the testimony of Phyllis Moretti,

and the written statement of Samuel H. Sheppard are properly admissible evidence.
Respectfully Submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, CUYAHOGA
COUNTY PROSECUTOR

even Dever
Marilyn Cassidy (001 64 7)
Assistant Prosecutors
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-7785
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing State's Memorandum in Support of Admission of Samuel H.
Sheppard's Writings in Moretti Book, was hand delivered to Teny Gilbert, on March 27,
f

2000 at Court Room 20 B, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113.
Respectfully Submitted,

Kathleen A. Martin
Assistant Prosecutor

-
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*119921
NOTICE: RULE 2 OF THE OHIO
COURT
RULES
FOR
THE
SUPREME
REPORTING
OF
OPINIONS
IMPOSES
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE
USE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.

THE DECLARANT WAS ADMITTED AS AN
EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RULE.

The STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Terry L. CROSSEN, Defendant-Appellant.

THE
TRIAL
COURT
COMMITTED
PREJUDICIAL
ERROR
IN
ADMITTING
EVIDENCE OF THE PRIOR SEXUAL ACTIVITY
OF THE DEFENDANT.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II

No. 902.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth District,
Ashland County.
Oct. 18, 1988.
Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas
Case No. 6346.
Robert P. Desanto, Prosecuting Attorney, Ramona

J. Rogers, Ass 't Prosecuting Attorney, Ashland, for
plaintiff-appellee.

-

Mark C.
appellant.

Heydinger,

Ashland,

for

defendant-

Before HOFFMAN, WISE and TURPIN, JJ.
OPINION

Appellant was charged in a two-count indictment of
having sexual contact with two-year old Rose Dotson
(Rose) on two different occasions in January, 1988.
A jury found appellant guilty of one count and not
guilty of the other count.
At trial, the two-year old Rose did not testify but,
over objection of appellant, the State introduced, by
way of testimony from the mother, Rose's out-ofcourt statement made to the mother that appellant "had
touched and kissed her cookie." Mother testified that
"cookie" was Rose's terminology for "vagina."
Following a prior hearing on the motion to suppress
those statements of hearsay, the trial court had ruled:
. . . that based on case law and the testimony
presented, the statements made by the two (2) year old
victim [Rose] to her mother constitute excited
utterances.

WISE, Judge.
**l This is an appeal from a judgment entered by
the Court of Common Pleas of Ashland County
sentencing defendant-appellant, Terry L. Crossen
(appellant), after he had been found guilty by a jury of
gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C.
2907.05(A)(3). Appellant argues the following two
assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I

-

THE
TRIAL
COURT
COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONTRAVENTION OF
RULE 806 OF THE OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE,
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT, AND THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
BY REFUSING TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT
TO ATT ACK THE CREDIBILITY OF NON
TESTIFYING DECLARANT OF A HEARSAY
STATEMENT
THROUGH
THE
USE
OF
SUBSEQUENT INCONSISTENT ST ATEMENTS,
WHEN THE PRIOR HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF

. .. that the mother, Wendy Dotson, will be entitled
to testify to said statements at a trial on this case.
Judgment Entry, March 10, 1988.
Upon cross-examination of the mother, appellant
attempted to elicit testimony from the mother
concerning other statements of Rose made at the
police station. The State objected to the admissibility
of the police station statements on the grounds that
those statements were not "excited utterances" and
were therefore impermissible hearsay. Rose made her
initial statement at home at approximately 1:00 a.m.
on January 21, 1988; the proffered evidence elicited
outside the hearing of the jury establishes that the
police station statements were made at approximately
"1:00 a.m. to 1:30 a.m." on January 21, 1988; that
mother and child were in the police station where a
recorded conversation was had between a police clerk,
mother, and Rose, the two-year-old. The transcript of
the conversation at the police station reveals that
Rose, in answering questions of the mother and police
clerk, gave answers that were inconsistent within the
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statement itself and with her initial statement to her
mother. In her transcribed statement, Rose several
times denied that the appellant had touched her or did
anything to her.
Also in the same transcribed
statement, Rose indicated that appellant had touched
her and at that time she had "told him to stop." See
proffered defendant's Exhibit C. The trial court ruled
that the police station statements were not "excited
utterances" and not an exception to the hearsay rule
and therefore could not be inquired into.

**2 We sustain appellant's first assignment of error
on two grounds. One, that the transcribed statement
was admissible under Civ .R. 806 and second, that the
transcribed statement was admissible under the excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

-

The initial statements of Rose that appellant had
touched and kissed her "cookie" were introduced by
the mother as an excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule pursuant to Evid.R. 803(2) and therefore
they were admitted as substantive evidence to prove
the truth of the touching and kissing--the matter
asserted. Evid.R. 806 provides for the admissibility
of subsequent inconsistent statements of the declarant
of the admitted hearsay statement for impeachment
purposes. The admission of the inconsistent statement
may be offered only to impeach the credibility of
declarant and not to prove or disprove the matter
asserted. State v. Kline (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 208
(compare State v. Allender [Sept. 6, 1988], Stark
App. No. CA-7464, unreported):

Page 2
establishing
inconsistency.
The
threshold
inconsistency requirement is met if a statement offered
for impeachment can be interpreted in either of two
ways, though only one interpretation is actually
inconsistent with the testimony of the witness sought
to be impeached.
Ohio evidence law recognizes
contradiction by reference to a material fact omitted in
a witness' prior statement or, in the case of a thirdparty hearsay declarant, an omission in a statement
made subsequent in time to one admitted in evidence
at trial.
By omitting a material fact under
circumstances in which it was natural and reasonable
for him to assert it, the declarant's subsequent
statement thereby contradicts his prior statement
admitted in evidence.
4. Whether an inconsistent statement actually
impeaches or otherwise discredits its maker is a
question of weight for the jury. If the subsequent,
extrajudicial statement is susceptible of different
meanings, one of which would be inconsistent with
the truth of in-court testimony, it is admissible in
evidence for the jury to determine which is the true
meaning, and to exclude such evidence is prejudicial
error. ( Dilcher v. State, 39 Ohio St. 130, paragraph
four of the syllabus, applied and followed.)
**3 We further hold that the statements made by
Rose at the police station at a time "between 1:00
a.m. and 1:30 a.m." are as much an excited utterance
as per the statements made to the mother at
"approximately 1:00 a.m." and should have been
admitted. State v. Duncan (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 215.
We sustain appellant's first assignment of error.

An extrajudicial statement offered for impeachment
purposes is not hearsay since it is not offered for the
truth of what it states (Evid.R. 80l[C], construed).
Syllabus 1, State v. Kline, supra.
While the transcribed police station statements can
be said to contain inconsistencies as well as
consistencies with her initial statement to her mother,
we also agree with syllabus 2, 3, and 4 of Kline,
supra, and so hold that:

-

2. When a witness testifies in court to admissible
hearsay statements of a third-party declarant, that
declarant' s
inconsistent
prior
or
subsequent
statements, whether oral or written, may be admitted
for the purpose of impeaching him. (Evid.R. 806,
construed.)
3. In Ohio, the rule is a liberal one with respect to

II

Appellant argues that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in admitting evidence of prior sexual
activity on the part of the defendant. The record
discloses that defendant did not take the stand nor was
any evidence by way of any witness or exhibits
introduced into evidence by the appellant (the
attempted introduction of the inconsistent statement by
Rose was excluded by the trial court). The State
offered the testimony of one Officer Lattanzi and also
introduced, through witness Officer Lattanzi, State's
Exhibit 4, which was a statement taken by Lattanzi
from the appellant at 12:40 on January 21, 1988. The
statement consists of eighteen pages, and on each page
the officer admonishes appellant to be truthful, "tell
me the truth ... tell me truthfully ... I don't believe
that . . . tell me the truth ... " etc.
Counsel for
appellant cross-examined officer Lattanzi extensively
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as to the officer's intent behind those statements. On
re-direct, Officer Lattanzi was asked by the
prosecutor at T.11-216:

Q. I would like you to tell the jury exactly and in
detail each and every reason that you had for not
believing him. (Emphasis added).

Q. In this case, why were you so persistent with
your questioning that night, January 20th--that
morning when you were questioning Terry Crossen,
why were you persistent with your questioning?

There was an objection which was overruled and the
officer was permitted to testify in detail to previous
acts committed by the appellant. The officer was
permitted to testify not only that appellant had initially
denied the prior acts, and that he had later said that
they were accidents, but the officer was permitted to
testify further that during the prior acts questioning,
appellant had "stated that the four-year-old unzipped
his pants and took his penis out and began rubbing on
it."
That appellant "had placed his finger in this
Without belaboring the
four-year-old's vagina."
matter nor fattening this opinion, we simply sustain
appellant's second assignment of error on the
authority of State v. Burson (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d
157; State v. Curry (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 66; State
v. Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391;
State v.
Thompson (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 496.

A. Terry doesn't like to talk about things like this.
At T.II-217:

Q. Have you had previous experience, talking to
Terry Crossen?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And how many occasions, approximately?
A. Two other occasions that I'm familiar with.
Following that, the prosecutor approached the bench
and informed the court that he was going into other
acts for the reason to show that this particular act was
not an accident. At T.II-219, the prosecutor asked the
question:

**4. Having sustained both appellant's assignments
of error, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas,
Ashland County, is reversed.

Q. Officer Lattanzi, you had stated to Mr. Fridline
[counsel for appellant] that you did not, as he was-Mr. Crossen was telling you that these were
accidents, you did not believe him. Do you recall
that?

JUDGMENT ENTRY

A. Yes, sir.

HOFFMAN, P.J., and TURPIN, J., concur.

For the reasons stated in the Memorandum-Opinion
on file, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas,
Ashland County, is reversed and this matter is
remanded to that court for further proceedings
according to law and not inconsistent with the opinion
filed herein.
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*14074
NOTICE: RULE 2 OF THE OHIO
SUPREME
COURT
RULES
FOR
THE
REPORTING
OF
OPINIONS
IMPOSES
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE
USE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.
Ralph S. TRIMBLE, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
John M. STEW ART, Jr., Administrator of the
Estate of Janet Ann Stewart, DefendantAppellant.
No. 1327.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District,
Geauga County.
Feb. 12, 1988.
Civil Appeal from the Court of Cornman Pleas
Probate Division, Case No. 85 P.C. 520.
Thomas R. Reinstatler, Cincinnati, for plaintiffappellee.

-

Barbara J. Gustaferro, Painesville, for defendantappellant.
Before FORD, P.J., and COOK, and CHRISTLEY,
JJ.
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seeking a declaration as to ownership of the $23,000.
He alleged he had given the decedent $24,000 to hold
and to invest for him and that, in June 1984, he asked
her to withdraw $1,000 of his money so he could buy
furniture for an apartment. He further alleged that the
remaining $23,000 should be returned to him.
After a bench trial, the court found that appellee had
transferred $24,000 to the decedent, that the
transaction failed to be an express trust but was a
resulting trust, and that appellant had developed a
"cooly calculated scheme to deprive his father-in-law
of his life savings." The court found that appellant
held the $23,000 in a constructive trust for appellee.
Appellant has appealed the judgment of the trial
court and has filed the following five assignments of
error:
"1. The trial court erred in failing to dismiss
appellee's complaint where the evidence showed a
failure to file a claim against the estate of the deceased
within the four month statutory limitation.
"2. The court erred in admitting into evidence
letters allegedly written by the deceased as they
constituted hearsay and did not come within any
exception to the hearsay rule.
"3. The court erred in not finding that the transfer
of funds by appellee to his daughter constituted a gift.

OPINION
"4. The court erred in finding that the transfer of
funds from the appellee to his daughter constituted a
constructive and/or resulting trust.

COOK, Judge.

**1 On March 6, 1985, Janet Ann Stewart died
from injuries sustained in an automobile accident.
Her husband, John M. Stewart, Jr., appellant, was
As
appointed administrator of her estate.
administrator, he compiled an inventory of the
decedent's estate. Included in the inventory was a
money market account in Janet Stewart's name with a
balance of $27 ,000.

"5. The court erred in failing to indemnify the
appellant, John M. Stewart, Jr., administrator of the
Estate of Janet Ann Stewart, from liability for
administration of the estate pursuant to § 2113. 56
O.R.C."
The assigned errors are without merit.

The decedent's father, Ralph S. Trimble, appellee,
claimed that $23,000 of the account was his and that
he had given that amount to his daughter to hold and
to invest for his benefit. He claimed appellant was
aware of this transfer of money and had assured him it
would be returned to him once the estate was settled.
However, appellant distributed the money to himself
as the decedent's heir.

Appellant first contends that the court erred in not
finding that appellee failed to file a claim against the
estate within the four month statutory limitation.

On November 18, 1985, appellee filed a declaratory
judgment action in the Geauga County Probate Court

**2 However, money held by a deceased in a
resulting trust, as in the instant cause, is not a debt

R. C. 2117. 07 requires that claims against an estate
of a deceased be filed within four months after the
appointment of an executor or administrator. If not
timely filed, said claims are forever barred.
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and may be recovered from the personal
representative of a deceased trustee without complying
with the provisions of R. C. 2117. 07.
S!aley v.
Kreinbihl (1949), 152 Ohio St. 315.
Generally
speaking, traceable trust property may be recovered
by the settlor-beneficiary although no claim has been
filed against the estate. Cook v. Crider (1939), 63
Ohio App. 12.
Appellant's second contention is that the court erred
in admitting into evidence, during appellee's case, two
letters allegedly written by the deceased tending to
prove appellee's claim.
He argues thit Evid.R.
804(B)(5) allows statements made by a decedent to be
offered only by the administrator or executor of a
decedent to rebut testimony by an adverse party, this
limited use of said statements of a deceased being an
exception to the hearsay rule.

-

The adoption of Evid.R. 601 abrogated the "dead
man's" statute, R.C. 2317.03. Johnson v. Porter
(1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 58.
In Johnson, the court
referred to the Staff Note to Evid.R. 601 to the effect
that concomitant to the adoption of said rule was the
adoption of Evid.R. 804(B)(5). The note indicated
Evid.R. 601 preserves one's competency to testify
while Evid.R. 804(B)(5) permits the adverse party to
introduce evidence, which would otherwise be
hearsay, to rebut such testimony.
However, in the instant cause, the otherwise hearsay
evidence was offered by appellee in support of his
claim against appellant as administrator of the
decedent's estate. The two letters from the decedent
were admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 804(B)(3),
"Statement against interest." The two letters included
statements by the deceased which were at the time of
their making "so far contrary to the declarant' s
pecuniary or proprietary interest * * * that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made
the statement unless he believed it to be true."
We conclude the court did not err in admitting the
two letters from the deceased to appellee in appellee' s
case.
Appellant's third contention is that the court erred in
not finding that the transfer of funds by appellee to his
daughter constituted a gift. He argues that transfers
made by a father to a daughter, without consideration,
are presumed to be gifts. He further argues that this
is true in the instant cause because the evidence
indicated that the money was put into a money market
account in the decedent's name and social security
number only, the decedent regularly withdrew the

Page 2

interest accrued on the principal, and the decedent
reported the interest as income on her tax return.
However, the elements of a valid gift inter vivas are
(1) an intention on the part of the donor to transfer

title and right of possession of the property to the
donee; and (2) delivery of the subject matter of the
gift to the donee with the relinquishment of
ownership, dominion, and control over it. Bolles v.
Toledo Trust Co. (1936), 132 Ohio St. 21.
In the instant cause, the evidence indicated that
appellee did not intend to transfer title and right of
possession of the $24,000 to his daughter and did not
intend to relinquish ownership of the money to her.
On March 21, 1984, after a phone call with appellee,
decedent sent him a letter in which she thanked her
father for a wedding gift and also assured him that she
would do as he wished with a second check. She
wrote " * * * and of course you can send me a check
that I'll put it in the bank for you--I think you want it
in my name and I understand your reason. That's
fine."
Subsequently, appellee sent the decedent a
check for $1,000 as a wedding gift and a check for
$24,000 to be deposited in a bank for his benefit. On
April 9, 1984, decedent sent appellee another letter
acknowledging receipt of the checks and reporting that
she put the $24,000 along with her own money into a
money market account. The account never fell below
$23,000 after appellee had requested $1,000 of his
money to buy furniture for his apartment.
**3 We conclude that the court did not err by
failing to find that the transfer of funds by appellee to
his daughter was a gift.
Appellant's fourth contention is that the court erred
in finding that the transfer of funds from appellee to
his daughter constituted a constructive and/or a
resulting trust.
However, appellant is unable to demonstrate his
alleged error. A review of the trial court's decision
indicates the court did not find that the subject transfer
of funds constituted a constructive and/or a resulting
trust. On the contrary, the court found that the
decedent held appellee's money in a resulting trust and
appellant, as a result of his action in including
appellant's trust money in the estate inventory and
distributing the money to himself as heir and
beneficiary, held appellee 's money for him in a
constructive trust.
Appellant's last contention is that the court erred in
failing to "indemnify" him from liability in the
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administration of his wife's estate pursuant to R.C.
2113.56.
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CHRISTLEY, J., joins in concurring opinion.
FORD, Presiding Judge, concurring.

R.C. 2113.56, in pertinent part, provides:
"An executor or administrator is not liable for any
distribution made in compliance with sections
2113.53, 2113.54, and 2113.55 of the Revised Code,

***"
R.C. 2113.53 provides:
f

"At any time after the appointment of an executor or
administrator, the executor or administrator may
distribute to the beneficiaries entitled thereto under the
will, if there is no action pending to set aside the will,
or to the heirs entitled thereto by law, in cash or in
kind, any part or all of the assets of the estate. * * *
If any executor or administrator distributes any part of
the assets of the estate before the expiration of the
time * * * for the filing of claims, he is personally
liable * * * to any claimant who subsequently
establishes his claim against the estate. The executor
or administrator shall be liable only to the extent that
the sum of the remaining assets of the estate * * * are
insufficient to satisfy the share of the * * * claims
against the estate. The executor or administrator shall
not be liable in any case for an amount greater than
the value of the estate that existed at the time that the
distribution of assets was made and that was subject to
* * * the claims."
Appellant argues that since he distributed the estate
proceeds in compliance with the statutes, he should be
"indemnified" from liability.
**4 While appellant cites good law, it is not
applicable in the instant cause. Here, the trial court
found that the transfer of the funds from appellee to
his daughter constituted a resulting trust, appellee
holding equitable title while the deceased held legal
title. Thus, the funds were removed from the funds of
the estate and out of the control of appellant as
administrator of the estate. Appellant held the funds
as trustee for appellee. He thus distributed the funds
to himself not as administrator of the estate but as
trustee of the constructive trust of the $23,000.
Thus, the court did not err in failing to "indemnify"
appellant from liability under R.C. 2113.56.

-

Judgment affirmed.
FORD, P.J., concurs with concurring opinion.

While I concur with the majority in this case, I am
inclined to be more restrictive. The record in this
case, and more specifically the conclusionary entry by
the trial court, indicate that the trial court determined
that the factual posture here provided the basis to
conclude that the moneys in question were the subject
of a constructive trust in which the appellant was the
trustee for the benefit of the appellee.
This
determination is evidenced by the following language
in the trial court's judgment entry:
"5. Defendant holds the trust fund as trustee of a
'constructive trust' for the benefit of plaintiff."
In its Memorandum of Ruling, the trial court
discusses both the concept of constructive trust as well
as that of a resulting one.
On the subject of
constructive trust in this Memorandum, the trial court
included the following quotations with attendant
citations:
"A constructive trust generally involves the
existence of fraud in view of which an equitable title
or interest is recognized in some person other than the
taker or holder of legal title. Relief in constructive
trust cases is granted on the ground of fraud, actual or
constructive, or merely upon the breach of the general
legal obligation of honesty and fair dealing.
53 Ohio Juris.2d 579,
N.E.2d 190

Fehrman vs. Ellison, 290

And furthermore:
A 'constructive trust' arises when one having title to
property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to
another because he would be unjustly enriched if he
were allowed to retain it.

Croston vs. Croston, 18 O.A.2d 159, 247 N.E.2
765"
Further, this Memorandum included this additional
language:
"The situation existing between the Plaintiff and
Defendant surely falls within the purview of the
definition of a 'constructive trust' in the last quote.
Defendant has legal title to the Plaintiff's money by
converting it to his own use. He also is subject to an
equitable duty to convey it to another (the Plaintift)

Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works

1988 WL 14074, Trimble v. Stewart, (Ohio App. 11 Dist. 1988)

-

because he would be unjustly enriched if he were
allowed to retain it."
See, also, 53 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d (1962) 391,
392, Trusts, Section 4.

**5. Consequently, in affirming the decision of the
trial court, I would do so only on the basis that the
trial court had properly concluded on the facts in this
case that a constructive trust be imposed in favor of
the appellee.

Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
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SAMUEL

H.

SHEPPARD,
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THEE. , W. SCRIPPS COl1PANY, et al,

Defendants

PlAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

-

ssell A.SherIDan
rlCtorney for Plaintiff
205 E.S.T. Bldg.
Elyria, Ohl".

-

Fl LED.
SJ

Ml '61

CLEn.~ 11.S.Oljf,~ICT COIJ~T
llO~TiiCli:I 015rt11CT OF OlilO

~I

IN THE U~IITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT Of OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
SAHUEL H. SHEPPARD
33 Hosel Str.
Duisburg, ~est Germany,

c 67 ~333

Plaintiff
vs

CIVIL NO.

THEE. W. SCRIPPS COMPANY
901 Lakeside Ave.
Cleveland, Ohio
LOUIS D. SELTZER
17825 Lake
Cleveland, Ohio

i

SAMUEL R. GERBER
11424 Cedar Rd.
Cleveland, Ohio,

I
·1

Defendants

I
I
I
I

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLJ\INT
l.

-

I
I

The Plaintiff, Samuel ![. SherJJ21r•l presently

resides at and is domiciled in Duisburg, West Germauy.

I

I

The Deren-

I

I

dants, Louis B. Seltzer and Samuel R. Gerber are citizens of the
State of Ohio.

The Defendant, The E. VI. Scripps Com11any is a

.

corporation incorporated under the laHs of the State of Ohio.
2.

I

'~

This action arise:> under the Fourteenth Amend-

42 §1983

ment to the Constitution of the United States under title
of the United States Code.

The matter in controversy exceeds,

exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of Ten

Thous~nd

and 00/10

Dollars ($10,000.00).

J.

T~e

Defendant, Louis B. Seltzer was, at the tim

of the wrongs herein complained of, the editor of a uewspaper call d
"The Cleveland Press"; said newspaper was published by the Defendant, The E. W. Scripps Company.

4.

The Defendant, Samuel R. Gerber, was at the tim

of the wrongs complained of, and still is, the coroner of Cuyahoga
County, State of Ohio.

-

As such coroner, he had the duty and the
report_~auses or deaths occurring
--··--------··-·-· -- -. ·- ····-···-·- ·-- --....... __ __

authority to investigate and
----------._ - .
within said Coµnty.

. -. ---- ·----···-···

.....

.....

r··

1 \.• µI
.. 1

-2-

5.

The Plaintiff, Samuel H. Sheppard was in 1954,

a physl.cl.an residing and practicine; in Cuyahoga Counly, State of
Ohio, and specializin5 in neurosurgery.

The Plaintiff in 1954 had

an active and successful r:iedical practice.

6.

On or about the 4th day of July, 1954, Marilyn

Sheppard, then the Plaintiff's v1ife, 1-i·:ls murdered i11 her hooe on
Lake Road in Day Villac;e, Ohio by n 11erson or persons to the Plain
'
tiff unknown.

7,

Follo1·1ins such m11nler, the Defen•h1nt, Samuel R.
f

Gerber, commenced an investie;atlon lnto its causes nnd into the
identity of the person or persons responsible for it.

8.

Following the murder, the Defenrlarits, Louis B.

Seltzer and The E. W. Scripps Company commenced an editorial a ttac'
upon the Plaintiff in the Cleveland Press, which was designed and
calculated to, and did in fact, cause elective prosecuting offi-

----------··-------- -------

~---.

___ ....----...

cials to accuse him of complicity aforesaid .
.....

-

--··-----9.

Between July 14, 1954 anrl July

JO, 1954, the

Defendants, Louis B. Seltzer and The E. W. Scripps Company conspl.red with the Defendant, Samuel R. Gerber, to implicate, accuse,
arrest and indict the Plaintiff for the said murder, even though
each of said Defendants well knew that the Plaintiff had nothing
to do with the murder of Marilyn Sheppard.

It was part of said

conspiracy that the Defendant, Samuel R. Gerber, would use his

-o·f·r1·zGi~;~;;;1,~;· ;~···~~;·;~·~·;· ·t~·· ~·~ t- ·~·~-~-:~~..~:~;;···:;-~·;~~:·-;::,; ..-~nd

...

wr.~i-r~-ii':f"·1;;;;1·i~-~~~-.-. ~~a:,,·~·~~se ~~· ~~-·~~~-~~·:-~~;-ri~l.ntif f
.......... ,,,,.,, ,,'"J"" ...-?

..... ~(··-·.._ .. ,,.... ··

..

.11".:•'"':"""..,... ... l"'.•,..-·~-......-u-- r-.-.·~

10.

r1··,.., .......... ··•·: ...... ··..:·., ..

,...~

•

-··,;• .. •..... .._, ........ ,,,.......

It was further a part of the conspiracy afore-

said that the Defendants, Louis B. Seltzer and The E. W. Scripps
Company

~ould

mount and launch an attach upon the Plaintiff cal-

.. -------·---·

cuiatcl·-t~--;;;;;-;t"hi-;-fr:m-ob·~-~~ni~~-: f~·i·;-t~ial uefore an im- -------·---- . - -·· -· -· .........

-parlTal--j~~Y· -;~--~- ·f~·;r---j~·de;~·~··-i·t--~~-~ further a part of the said
-·---···-···· . --- -··-.
conspiracy for the Defendants, Louis B. Seltzer and The E. W. Seri ps

Company to so influence, intimidate and control the trial judge
who presided at Plaintiff's criminal trial for the murder of his

'-·---·

wife, Marilyn Sheppard, as to cause said judge to make wrongful
·-·

----------·----------

J

II
11

-)-

,_.I and

adverse rulings to the Plaintiff.

It was

furt;ll~r

a part of

said conspiracy for the Defendant, Samuel R. Gerber, to issue

__

state'l!~n.t-3.-~~e;gestlve

------

_,_,_...

--

---..

.. ,,.

------·..

of Plaintiff's guilt before an impartial

-· ..

jury could be selected; and to give false and prejudicial testi- - - - - - - - " . . . __..._..._______..----- .. - . .______ --.-...""_"_6.0'._~ .. r~-·~·-....w .. ":- ...

~y_agai.r.s.t-thz ... P~.[_e_!!~~.t;.~ ·-~.~...~.~-s---~~.~;-.~ :..

I t ;.;as fu:rther a part

of the conspiracy
for the Defendants, Louis B. Seltz.er, and The
,
E. W. Scripps Company to publish, during the trial, and to thus

,

call to the attention of the Pl~intiff's petit jury, hearing the
case against him, prejudicial and irw.dmissible material which the
Defendants well knew could not reach said jury ln the courtroom
and which the Defendants knew would cause the Plaintiff's wrongful conviction.

--·-···

11.

The Defendants effectu:J.ted each of the above-

described illegal and wrongful acts, and thus
the wrongful conviction of the Defendant.
12.

-

-

cause~,

as planned,

In so conspirine; and nctini:;, Lhe Defendants

deprived the Plaintlff of his Federal constitutional right to a
fair trial under the Fourteenth Aa1cndment to the United States
Constitution.
lJ.

By so conspirine; and actlng, the Defendants

deprived the Plaintiff

of~

Due Process of La·t1 under t.i\e Fourteenth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

14.

By so conspirine; and actini::;, the Defendants

deprived the Plaintiff of the rights, privileges, at1d immunities
secured to him by the United States Constitution.

As a result of

such conspiracy and action by the Defendants, lhe Plaintiff has
been damaged, (1) by his imprisonment for approximately ten years
in various jails and prisons in the State of Ohio, (2) by a loss
of income for thirteen years as a physician

licens~·in

the State

of Ohio, (J) by the fees, costs, and expenses of defending himself against the indictments and judgments wrongfully procured as
set forth above, and (4) by the loss of reputation and community
respect suffered as a result of these proceedin5s.

-

-4WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands:

1.

Yhat the Defendants be required to pay to the

Plaintiff such damages as Plaintiff has sustained in consequence
of Defendants'

unla~ful

2.

acts as aforesaid.

That Plaintiff have such other and further

relie.f as the la:·1 and justice may require.
A trial by jury ls hereby requested.
f

...--- u sell A. Sherman,
Attorney for Plolntiff
205 Elyria Savings & Trust Bl g.
Elyria, Ohio
J2J-JJJ2
F. Lee Bailey
Forty Court St.
Boston, Massachusetts

-

-

Benjamin L. Clark
50 West Broad St.
Columbus, Ohio,
Of Counsel
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

SAMUEL

I-I.

SHEPPARD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
Tim E. W. ScmI'PS CoMPANY, Loms
B. SELTZEH, SAl\!UEL R. GERBER,
Defendants-Appellees.

A P l' E A L from the
United States District
Court, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern
Division.

Decided January 21, 1970.

Before:

PEG'K,

l\1cCnEE and Col\rns, Circuit Judgcs.

Circuit Judge. The complaint filed in the District
Court in this action alleges a deprivation of constitutional
rights and seeks recovery of damages under the provisions
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleges the murder of
plaintiff's wife July 4, 1954, and his arrest, indictment, trial
and conviction therefor. Recovery is sought from the publisher
of a newspaper, its editor and the local county coroner, hereinafter referred to as Gerber. It is alleged that as a result of
conspiratorial conduct of the clefendants during the investigatory and trial proceedings culminating in his conviction plaintiff was deprived of a fair trial, due process of law ancl the
rights, privileges and immunities securecl to him by the United
States Constitution. The judgment of conviction was subsequently vacatecl by the Supreme Court and the cause re. mantled for a new trial in the state court, which resulted in a
verdict of acquittal. In the present action, the District Court
sustained the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint,
PECK,

t

•

'
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and this appeal wns perfected from the orcler granting that
motion.
Early in its opinion, the District Court offers this observation:

~

I

I'1

"At the outset, this court determines that the complaint must fail in its entirety if, for any reason, it
is insufficient to state a claim as to Gerber, for, since
defendants Scripps ancl Seltzer are chargeable only as
private citizens and cannot be said to act 'uncler color
of any State Law,' it is clear from nearly a hundred
years of case law that the Civil Rights Act, affording
protection against deprivation of civil rights by state action, is not applicable to them, absent a conspiracy with
one so acting."

Sheppard v. E. W. Scripps Co., et al.

3

of appellant's conviction and the remand for retrial (Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) ). That this issue was squarely before the Supreme Court becomes apparent in the first
paragraph of Mr. J usticc Clark's opinion ( 384 U.S. 335):
"This federal habeas corpus application involves the
question whether Sheppard was deprived of a fair trial
in his state conviction for the second-degree murder of
his wife because of the trial judge's failure to protect
Sheppard sufficiently from the massive, pervasive and
prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution . . . .
We have concluded that Sheppard did not receive a
fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
Fomteenth Amendment and, therefore, reverse the judgment."

We are in accord with this expression. See Shelly v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1947); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17
(1883); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968);
Cooper v. Wilson, 309 F.2cl 153 (6th Cir. 1962); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Company, 255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1966).

The opinion proceeds with a detailed review of the facts
of the offense and of the trial, which is perhaps best summed
up in the often quoted language of Judge Bell of the Supreme
Court of Ohio and which is set forth in Justice Clark's opinion (384 U.S. 356):

In his brief appellant states that the decision of the District Court appealed from was preclicatecl upon two conclusions of law, namely that the complaint <lid not allege
conduct by Gerber "under color of law," and that Gerber's
position as coroner was quasi-judicial in character, affording
him immunity. While it is true that the opinion of the District Court deals with these two issues at length, that opinion
further resolves a third issue adversely to appellant in this
language: "[N]othing Gerber is alleged to have done under
color of law could properly be said to be the cause of any
deprivation of rights the plaintiff allegedly suffered." If this
true, whether or not the acts were done under color of
law obviously becomes immaterial.

"'Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were
combined in this case in such a manner as to intrigue
and captivate the public fancy to a degree perhaps unparalleled in recent annals. Throughout the preindictment investigation, the subsequent legal skirmishes and
the nine-week trial, circulation-conscious editors catered
to the insatiable interest of the American public in the
bizarre . . . . In this atmosphere of a "Roman holiday"
for the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life.'
165 Ohio St., at 294, 135 N.E.2d 342."

.

"

is

. The issue as to whether Gerber's acts were the cause of
the alle( .onstitutional deprivation has been passed upon by
the Supreme Court in the opinion resulting in the vacation

(

~

Justice Clark follows that quotation with this observation:
"Indeed, every court that has considered this case, save the
court that tried it, has deplored the manner in which the
news media inflamed and prejudiced the public.'' The very
fact that the trial was conducted under ~nch deplorable
conditions, however, points up the fact tha' .! deprivation

Sheppard v. E. W. Scripps Co., et al.
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of appellant's constitutional rights resulted from the unfortunate circumstances accompanying the trial itself rather than
from any conduct Gerber may have engaged in. That the
Supreme" Court found this to be true clearly appears from
its opinion, which squarely places the blame where it really
belongs under our system of administration of justice, on
the trial judge.
After observing that the trial began two weeks "before a
highly contested election at which both Chief Prosecutor
Mahon and Trial Judge Blythin were candidates for judgeships," Justice Clark continues (384 U.S. 354-55):

5

rnptive inHuenccs in the courtroom, we must reverse the
denial of the habeas petition."

I

r

"While we cannot say that Sheppard \Vas denied due
process by the judge's refusal to take precautions against
the influence of pretrial publicity alone, the court's later
rulings must be considered against the setting in which
the trial was held. In light of this background, we believe that the arrangements made by the judge with
the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of the
'judicial serenity and calm to which [he] was entitled.'
Estes v. State of Texas . . . 381 U.S., at .536, 85 S. Ct.,
at 1629. The fact is that bedlam reigned at the courthouse <luring the trial and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard."

\

After a further review of the facts and the publicity attendant
upon the trial, the opinion commented upon the absence of
rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen and
insulating the proceedings from prejudicial publicity and
disruptive influences, and then concluded "that these procedures would have been sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a
fair trial." ( 384 U.S. 358). Finally, in concluding the opinion Justice Clark stated ( 384 U.S. 363):

J.

"Since the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to
protect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and to control dis-

'

Sheppard v. E. \V. Scripps Co., ct al.

t

The essence of the complaint in the present case is contained in its allegations charging a deprivation of constitutional rights by Gerber, but as is demonstrated in the foregoing
quotations the Supreme Court has already determined that
the trial judge, not Gerber, is responsible for that deprivation. In view of that determination, it must be here concluded that the District Judge properly found that no cause
of action was stated.
Since we find the controlling issue to have been determined
by the Supreme Court it is unnecessary to here examine the
other grounds relied upon by the District Judge, and we
expressly refrain from expressing an opinion on the claimed
deficiency of the comp bin t in not specifically stating that the
various acts allcgc<l were committed "un<lcr color of law,"
and as to whether Coroner Gerber was entitled to judicial
immunity. W c observe, however, that even in the absence of
the opinion in Sheppard \'. Maxwell, supra, the greater weight
of authority and better reasoned decisions would require us
to find the lack of a cause of action. Striker v. Pincher,
317 F.2cl 780 (6th Cir. 1963); Cuiksa v. City of Mansfield,
250 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1957); Dunn v. Gazola, 216 F.2d
709 (1st Cir. 1954); Whittington v. Johnston, 201 F.2d 810
(5th Cir. 1954); Reinke v. Walworth, Count!} Sheriff, 282 F.
Supp. 377 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Sinchak. v. Parente, 262 F. Supp.
79 (W.D. Pa. 1966). In Striker v. Pincher, supra, this court
considered a situation in which plaintiff claimed to have been
deprived of constitutional rights by County Sheriff Pincher.
We therein observed that "Pincher did not directly deprive
Striker of any right of any sort. He had no authority or
shadow of authority in respect to the trial. It is not claimed
that statute, custom or usage gave Pincher any authority in
respect to the trial . . . . " ( 317 F.2d 783). This pronouncement has precise application to the circumstances with which

t
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we arc concerned, in which Gerber "had no authority or
shadow of authority in respect to the trial." In Cuiksa, supra,
we considered a situation in which the alleged deprivation, as
here, consisted of actions on the part of a defendant in initiating the prosecution and in testifying at the trial. We
held that these actions did not deprive the appellant therein
of any constitutional right, and with reference to the constable
defendant-appellce observed, "Nor is he responsible for the
subsequent actions and rulings of the judge." (250 F.2d 704).
Similarly, in the present case it could scarcely be contended
that Gerber was in any way responsible for Judge Blythin's
conduct of the trial. In Whiltington, supra, another situation existed in which the plaintiff alleged a {deprivation of
rights, but wherein the court pointed out that "[i]f there was
any denial of due process, the efficient cause thereof was
the omission of the state probate judge to give notice of
the proceeding. That failure is not attributable to these
defendants." ( 201 F.2d 811). The analogy to the case here
reviewed is too obvious to require comment.

In accordance with the foregoing, .. the order of the District
Court from which this appeal was perfected is affirmed.
McCnEE, Circuit J udgc, concurring. I concur in the result
reached by my brethren. However, I do not agree with
their conclusion that the Supreme Court's determination in
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 ( 1966), that appellant's
rights were violated by "the [trial] judge's failure to insulate
the proceedings from prejudicial publicity and disruptive
influences'', 384 U.S. at 358 n. 11, necessarily precludes the
possibility that his rights might also have been violated by
a conspiracy to prosecute him without cause and to prevent
a ·fair trial. Appellant has alleged that certain private perSOJlS engaged in publishing newspapers and a public official
coqspircd to corrupt the judicial process in order to obtain
for murder, and, on a motion to dismiss, we
his convil
must accc1)L these allegations as true. The deprivation of

'

I

I

I

!

'
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constitutional rights which the Supreme Court found in Sheppard v. Ji.faxwell and the deprivation alleged here are not
mutually exclusive, and the fact that appellant chose one as
the basis for his habeas corpus petition in 1963 should not
prevent him from basing a damage suit on the othcr. 1
Nevertheless, I agree with the District Judge who hcl<l
that the allegedly actionable conduct of Coroner Gerber is
insulated from liability under the Civil Rights Act by a doctrine analogous to that of judicial immunity. As the District
Judge observed in his opinion, the Supreme Court has held
that the Civil Rights Act did not abrogate the common law
immunity of certain public officials for actions within their
jurisdiction. 2 This doctrine applies not only to judges, but
also to other officials whose duties arc quasi-judicial. Kenney
v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied sub nom.
Kenney v. Killian, 352 U.S. 855 (1956). And the same immunity has been extended to coroners. Hebert v. -Morley,
273 F. Supp. 800, 802-03 ( C.D. Cal. 1967). I agree with the
District Court that the only conduct in which defendant
Gerber is alleged to have engaged under color of law must
be characterized, under the laws of Ohio and under the Civil
Rights Act, as quasi-judicial. See State ex rel. Harrison v.
Perry, 113 Ohio St. 641, 644-45, 150 N .E. 78 ( 1925). Since
this action cannot be maintained against Gerber, the only
defendant who acted under color of law, it must fail as to
the others. Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir.
1965).
1 An action for malicious prosecution might have been filed in
state court, but that does not render unavailable the remedies of
the Civil Rights Act. Diversity is not alleged here, and therefore
I do not consider whether appellant has a good cause of action
for malicious prosecution under the Ohio tort law. See Sheppard
\'. The E. W. Scripps Co., No. 18,978 (6th Cir. 1969).
2 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); see Bradley v. Fisher, 13
Wall. 335 (1872) (common law immunity). The immunity applies
even to acts which are alleged, as are those here, to have been
maliciously or corruptly motivated. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 554.
The policy behind this rule is not difficult to discern. As the Supreme
Court expressed it, a judge "should not have to
that unsatisfied
litigants may hound him with litigation chargi
alice and corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges w
contribute not
to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation." Id.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

SAMUEL

H.

SnEPPAnD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
TIIE

n.

E. vV.

SCIUI'PS COMPANY,

Loms

R. GEnnEn,
Defendants-Appellees.

SELTZEH, SAMUEL

A l' l' E A L from the
United States District
Court, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern
Division.

Dcciclecl January 21, 1970.

Before:

PECK, McCmm and CoMBS, Circuit Judges.

PECK, Circuit Judge.
The complaint filed in the District
Court in this action alleges a deprivation of constitutional
rights and seeks recovery of damages under the provisions
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleges the murder of
plaintiff's wife July 4, 1954, and his arrest, indictment, trial
and conviction therefor. H.ccovcry is sought from the publisher
of a newspaper, its editor and the local county coroner, hereinafter referred to as Gerber. It is alleged that as a result of
conspiratorial conduct of the defendants during the investigatory and trial proceedings culminating in his conviction plaintiff was deprived of a fair trial, due process of law and the
rights, privileges and immunities secured to him by the United
States Constitution. The judgment of conviction was subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court and the cause reman<le<l for a new trial in the state court, which resulted in a
verdict of acquittal. In the present action, the District Court
sust:i.ined the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint,
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and this appeal was perfected from the order granting that
motion.
Early in its opinion, the District Court oilers this observation:

of appellant's conviction and the remand for retrial (Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) ). That this issue was squarely before the Supreme Court becomes apparent in the first
paragraph of Mr. Justice Clark's opinion ( 384 U.S. 335):

"At the outset, this court determines that the complaint must fail in its entirety if, for any reason, it
is insuHicient to state a claim as to Gerber, for, since
defendants Scripps ancl Seltzer are chargeable only as
private citizens and cannot be said to act 'under color
of any State Law,' it is clear from nearly a hundred
years of case law that the Civil H.ights Act, a[orcling
protection against deprivation of civil rights by state action, is not applicable to them, absent a conspiracy with
one so acting."

"This federal habeas corpus application involves the
question whether Sheppard was deprivecl of a fair trial
in his state conviction for the second-degree murder of
his wife because of the trial judge's failure to protect
Sheppard sufficiently from the massive, pervasive ancl
prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution . . . .
We have concluded that Sheppard did not receive a
fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, reverse the judgment."

.[

We are in accord wilh this expression. See Shelly v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (19 117); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17
( 1883); I'.Ittlligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968);
Cooper v. 'Vilson, 309 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1962); Jones v.
Alfred II. Mayer Company, 255 F. Supp. l15 (E.D. Jvlo. 1966).

The opinion proceeds with a detailed review of the facts
of the offense and of the trial, which is perhaps best summed
up in the often quoted language of Judge Bell of the Supreme
Court of Ohio and which is set forth in Justice Clark's opinion (384 U.S. 356):

In his brief appellant states th;t the decision of the District Court appealed from was predicated upon two conclusions of law, namely that the complaint did not allege
conduct by Gerber "under color of law," and that Gerber's
position as coroner was quasi-judicial in character, affording
him immunity. While it is true that the opinion of the District Court deals with these two issues at length, that opinion
further resolves a third issue adversely to appellant in this
language: "[N]othing Gerber is alleged to have clone under
color of law could properly be said to be the cause of any
deprivation of rights the plaintiff allegedly suffered." U this
is true, whether or not the acts were done under color of
law obviously becomes immaterial.

"'Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were
combined in this case in such a manner as to intrigue
and captivate the public fancy to a degree perhaps unparalleled in recent annals. Throughout the preindictmcnt investigation, the subsequent legal skirmishes and
the nine-week trial, circulation-conscious editors catered
to the insatiable interest of the American public in the
bizarre . . . . In this atmosphere of a "Homan holiday"
for the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life.'
165 Ohio St., at 2~H, 135 N.E.2d 312."

The issue as to whether Gerber's acts were the cause of
the all(
constitutional deprivation has been passed upon by
the Supreme Court in the opinion resulting in the vacation

.
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Justice Clark follows that quotation with this observation:
"Indeed, every court that has considered this case, save the
court that tried it, has deplored the manner in which the
news media inflamed and prejudiced the public." The very
fact that the trial was conducted under such deplorable
conditions, however, points up the fact th:f ·c deprivation
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of appellant's constitutional rights resulted from the unfortunate circumstances accompanying the trial itself rather than
from any conduct Gerber may have engaged in. That the
Supreme· Court found this to be true clearly appears from
its opinion, which squarely places the blame where it really
belongs under our system of administration of justice, on
the trial judge.
After observing that the trial began two weeks "before a
highly contested election at which both Chief Prosecutor
Mahon and Trial Judge Blythin were candidates for judgeships," Justice Clark continues ( 384 U.S. 354-55):

The essence of the complaint in the present case is contained in ils allegations charging a deprivation of constitutional rights by Gerber, but as is demonstrated in the foregoing
quotations the Supreme Court has already determined that
the trial judge, not Gerber, is responsible for that deprivation. In view of that determination, it must be here concluded that the District J udgc properly found that no cause
of action was stated.
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"Since the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to
protect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and to control dis-

'
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ruptivc inlluences in the courlroorn, we must reverse the
denial of the habeas petition."

"While \:Ve cannot say that Sheppard was denied <luc
process by the judge's refusal to take precautions against
the influence of pretrial publicity alone, the court's later
rulings must be considered against the setting in which
the trial was held. In light of this background, we believe that the arrangements made by the judge with
the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of the
'judicial serenity ancl calm to which [he] was entitled.'
Estes v. State of Texas . . . 381 U.S., at 536, 85 S. Ct.,
at 1629. The fact is that bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hmmding most of the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard."
After a further review of the facts and the publicity attendant
upon the trial, the opinion commented upon the absence of
rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen and
insulating the proceedings from prejudicial publicity and
disruptive influences, ancl then concluded "that these procedures would have been sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a
fair trial." ( 384 U.S. 358). Finally, in concluding the opinion Justice Clark stated ( 384 U.S. 363):
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Since we find the controlling issue to have been determined
by the Supreme Court il is unnecessary to here examine the
other grounds relied upon by the District Judge, and we
expressly refrain from expressing an opinion on the claimed
deficiency of the complaint in not specifically stating that the
various acls allcgecl were committccl "under color of law,"
ancl as to whether Coroner Gerber was entitled to judicial
immunity. vVc observe, however, that even in the absence of
the opinion in Slzcppard v. i\! ax well, supra, the greater weight
of authority ancl better reasoned decisions would require us
to fincl the lack of a cause of aclion. Strihcr v. Pincl1cr,
317 F.2cl 780 (6th Cir. 1963); Cuiksa v. Citu of Mansfield,
250 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1957); Dunn v. Gawla, 216 F.2d
709 (1st Cir. 1954); "\Vhittington v. Johnston, 201 F.2d 810
(5th Cir. 1954); Reinke v. Wal worth, C ountu Sl1eriff, 282 F.
Supp. 377 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Sinclwk v. Parente, 262 F. Supp.
79 (W.D. l)a. 1966). In Striher v. Pincher, supra, this court
considered a situation in which plaintiff claimed to have been
deprived of constitutional rights by County Sheriff finchcr.
We therein observed that "Pincher did not directly deprive
Striker of any right of any sort. He hac.1 no authority or
shadow of authority in respect to the trial. It is not claimed
that statute, custom or usage gave Pincher any authority in
respect to the trial . . . . " ( 317 F .2d 783). This pronouncement has precise application to the circumstances with which
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we arc concerned, in which Gerber "had no authority or
shadow of authority in respect to the trial." In Cuiksa, supra,
we considered a situation in which the alleged deprivation, as
here, consisted of actions on the part of a defendant in initialing the prosecution and in testifying at the trial. We
held that these actions <lid not deprive the appellant therein
of any constitutional right, and with reference to the constable
defendant-appcllec observed, "Nor is he responsible for the
subsequent actions and rulings of the judge." (250 F.2d 7M).
Similarly, in the present case it could scarcely be contended
that Gerber was in any way responsible for Judge Blythin's
conduct of the trial. In YVhittington, supra, another situation existed in which the plaintiIT alleged a {deprivation of
rights, but wherein the court pointed out that "[i]f there was
any denial of due process, the efficient cause thereof was
the omission of the state probate judge to give notice of
the proceeding. That failure is not attributable to these
defendants." ( 201 F.2d 811). The analogy to the case here
reviewed is too obvious to require comment.

7

constitutional rights which the Supreme Court found in Sheppard v. Maxwell and the deprivation alleged here arc not
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In accordance with the foregoing>- the order of the District
Court from which this appeal was perfected is affirmed.
McCnEE, Circuit J udgc, concurring. I concur in the result
reached by my brethren. However, I do not agree with
their conclusion that the Supreme Court's determination in
Sl1eppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), that appellant's
rights were violated by "the [trial] judge's failure to insulate
the proceedings from prejudicial publicity and disruptive
inilucnces", 384 U.S. at 358 n. 11, necessarily precludes the
possibility that his rights might also have been violated by
a conspiracy to prosecute him without cause and to prevent
a' fair trial. Appellant has alleged that certain private perscm engaged in publishing newspapers and a public official
co1,1spircd to corrupt the judicial process in order to obtain
his conv\ l for murder,. and, on a motion to di.smi~s, we
must acccvc these allegat10ns as true. The clcpnvat10n of
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mutually exclusive, and the fact that appellant chose one as
the basis for his habeas corpus petition in 1963 should not
prevent him from basing a damage suit on the othcr. 1
Nevertheless, I agree with the District Judgc who held
that the allegedly actionable conduct of Coroner Gerber is
insulated from liability under the Civil Rights Act by a doctrine analogous to that of judicial immunity. As the District
Judge observed in his opinion, the Supreme Court has held
that the Civil Rights Act did not abrogate the common law
immunity of certain public officials for actions within their
jurisdiction. 2 This doctrine applies not only to judges, but
also to other officials whose duties arc quasi-judicial. Kenney
v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied sub nom.
Kenney v. Killian, 352 U.S. 855 (1956). And the same immunity has been extended to coroners. Hebert v. Morley,
273 F. Supp. 800, 802-03 ( C.D. Cal. 1967). I agree with the
District Court that the only conduct in which defendant
Gerber is alleged to have engaged under color of law must
be characterized, under the laws of Ohio and under the Civil
Hights Act, as quasi-judicial. See State ex rel. Harrison v.
Perry, 113 Ohio St. 641, 644-45, 150 N.E. 78 (1925). Since
this action cannot be maintained against Gerber, the only
defendant who acted under color of law, it must fail as to
the others. Haldane v. Chagnon, 3,15 F.2d 601 (9th Cir.
1965).
1 An action for malicious prosecution might have been filed in
state court, but that docs not render unavailable the remedies of
the Civil Rights Act. Diversity is not alleged here, and therefore
I do not consider whether appellant has a good cause of action
for malicious prosecution under the Ohio tort law. Sec Sheppard
v. The E. W. Scripps Co,, No. l!l,978 (Gth Cir. 1969).
2 Pierson v. Ray, 3llG U,S. 547 (1967); sec Bradley v. Fisher, 13
Wall. 335 (lll72) (common law immunity). The immunity applies
even to acts which arc alleged, as arc those here, to have been
maliciously or corruptly motivated. Pierson v. Ray, 3llG U.S. nt 55•t
The policy behind this rule is not difficult to discern. As the Supreme
Court expressed it, a judge "should not have to fc:ir that unsatisfied
litigants may hound him with litigation chargi1'
'alice and corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges wt\
contribute not
to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation." Id.

